Encrypted Search

Private Information Retrieval and Systems

Cipher Maps: A Unified Framework for Oblivious Function Approximation Through Algebraic Structures and Bernoulli Models

Encrypted Search and Oblivious Types

Oblivious types give encrypted search information-theoretic privacy against access pattern leakage. No ORAM, no computational hardness assumptions. Here's how.

Encrypted Search with Oblivious Bernoulli Types: Information-Theoretic Privacy through Controlled Approximation

Maximizing Confidentiality in Encrypted Search Through Entropy Optimization

Algebraic Cipher Types: A Functorial Framework for Secure Computation

Apertures: Coordinated Partial Evaluation for Distributed Computation

Known Plaintext Attacks on Time Series Encryption

Why naive encryption of temporal data leaks more than you'd expect, and what to do about it.

Estimating Confidentiality of Encrypted Search Systems: A Probabilistic Framework

Boolean Algebra over Trapdoor Sets: A Practical Framework for Privacy-Preserving Set Operations with Probabilistic Guarantees

Rank-Ordered Encrypted Search

Rank-ordered search over encrypted documents using oblivious entropy maps, enabling relevance scoring without revealing document contents.

Time Series Analysis of Confidentiality Degradation in Encrypted Search Systems

Estimating How Confidential Encrypted Searches Are Using Moving Average Bootstrap Method

IEEE Paper: Estimating Encrypted Search Confidentiality via Bootstrap

My first IEEE publication. Using bootstrap methods to estimate how many queries an adversary needs to break encrypted search.

Estimating How Confidential Encrypted Searches Are Using Moving Average Bootstrap Method

Encrypted Search - Enabling Standard Information Retrieval Techniques for Several New Secure Index Types While Preserving Confidentiality Against an Adversary With Access to Query Histories and Secure Index Contents

Encrypted Search - Enabling Standard Information Retrieval Techniques for Several New Secure Index Types While Preserving Confidentiality Against an Adversary With Access to Query Histories and Secure Index Contents